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Abstract
We study how the use of judgement or “add-factors” in macroeco-
nomic forecasting may disturb the set of equilibrium outcomes when
agents learn using recursive methods. We isolate conditions under
which new phenomena, which we call exuberance equilibria, can exist
in standard macroeconomic environments. Examples include a simple
asset pricing model and the New Keynesian monetary policy frame-
work. Inclusion of judgement in forecasts can lead to self-fulﬁlling
ﬂuctuations, but without the requirement that the underlying ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium is locally indeterminate. We suggest ways
in which policymakers might avoid unintended outcomes by adjusting
policy to minimize the risk of exuberance equilibria. JEL codes: E520,
E610. Key words: Learning, expectations, excess volatility, bounded
rationality, monetary policy.
∗
An early version of this paper was presented at the ECB Conference “Monetary Policy
and Imperfect Knowledge,” Würzburg, Germany. We thank Martin Ellison, Roger Farmer,
Petra Geraats, Eran Guse, Sharon Kozicki, Albert Marcet, Danny Quah, Bob Tetlow and
the participants at the ECB conference and many other conferences and seminars for their
comments.
†
Email: bullard@stls.frb.org. Any views expressed are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reﬂect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or of the Federal
Reserve System.
‡
Email: gevans@uoregon.edu.
§
Email: smsh4@cam.ac.uk. Financial support from ESRC grant RES-000-23-1152 is
gratefully acknowledged.
1 Introduction
1.1 Judgement variables in forecasting
Judgement is a fact of life in macroeconomic forecasting. It is widely under-
stood that even the most sophisticated econometric forecasts are adjusted
before presentation. This adjustment is so pervasive that it is known as the
use of “add-factors”–subjective changes to the forecast which depend on the
forecaster’s assessment of special circumstances that are not well summarized
by the variables that are included in the econometric model. A forthright
discussion of how prominently judgement enters into actual macroeconomic
forecasting is contained in Reifschneider, Stockton, and Wilcox (1997). As
they state, “... [econometric] models are rarely, if ever, used at the Federal
Reserve without at least the potential for intervention based on judgement.
Instead, [the approach at the Federal Reserve] involves a mix of strictly al-
gorithmic methods (“science”) and judgement guided by information not
available to the model (“art”) (p. 2, italics in original). Recently, some au-
thors have argued that economic theory needs to take explicit account of the
eﬀects of judgement on the behavior of macroeconomic systems.1
We wish to think of the news or add-factor that modiﬁes the forecast as
a qualitative, unique, commonly understood economy-wide variable: In sum,
a judgement variable. An example of a judgemental adjustment is suggested
by Reifschneider, et al. (1997), when they discuss the “ﬁnancial headwinds”
that were thought to be inhibiting U.S. economic growth in the early to
mid-1990s. As they discuss, the headwinds add-factor was used to adjust
forecasts over a period of many quarters. It was communicated to the public
prominently in speeches by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan. It
was thus widely understood throughout the economy and was highly serially
correlated. This is the type of variable we have in mind, although by no
means would we wish to restrict attention to this particular example.2 We
1
Judgement explicitly enters the analysis in a monetary policy context in Svensson
(2003, 2005) and Svensson and Tetlow (2005). Jansson and Vredin (2001) provide an
empirical analysis of the impact of judgement on forecasting by the Bank of Sweden.
2
Other examples include the Cuban Missile Crisis, wage and price controls, Hurricane
1
think add-factoring is occurring continuously.
Conventional wisdom among economists suggests that judgement is all
to the good in macroeconomic forecasting. Models are, of course, crude ap-
proximations of reality and must be supplemented with other information
not contained in the model.3 While we have motivated our ideas in terms
of macroeconomic forecasting, our framework applies more generally to eco-
nomic environments where expectations and qualitative judgements about
the eﬀects of unique events play an important role.
1.2 Feedback from judgement
Our focus in this paper is on how the add-factor or judgemental adjustment
of forecasts may create more problems than it solves. In particular, we show
how such a practice can lead to the possibility of self-fulﬁlling ﬂuctuations.
For expositional simplicity, in the main analysis we focus on the extreme case
where the judgement variable is not intrinsically related to economic funda-
mentals at all. Thus our results come from a situation where the forecasting
judgement being added is, fundamentally speaking, not useful in forecasting
the variables of interest. However, this assumption is not essential. We also
demonstrate that self-fulﬁlling ﬂuctuations can occur in cases where judge-
ment is related to fundamentals.
We study systems with well-deﬁned rational expectations equilibria. We
replace rational expectations with adaptive learning using the methodology of
Evans and Honkapohja (2001). We then investigate the equilibrium dynam-
ics of the system if the econometric models of the agents are supplemented
with judgement. To deﬁne an exuberance equilibrium, we ﬁrst require that
the perceived evolution of the economy corresponds to the actual evolution
by imposing a rational expectations equilibrium with limited information, or
more speciﬁcally the consistent expectations equilibrium (CEE) concept, as
Katrina, the Y2K millenium bug, the savings and loan crisis, and the September 11th,
2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S.
3
Svensson (2003, 2005) and Svensson and Tetlow (2005), for instance, formally show
how the use of judgement by policymakers can improve economic performance.
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developed by Sargent (1991), Marcet and Sargent (1995) and Hommes and
Sorger (1998). Under this requirement, the autocovariance generating func-
tions of the perceived and actual evolutions correspond exactly. Secondly,
we require individual rationality in individual agents’ choice to include the
judgement variable in their forecasting model, given that all other agents are
using the judgement variable and hence causing it to inﬂuence the actual
dynamics of the macroeconomy. Finally, we require learnability or expecta-
tional stability. When all three of these requirements are met, we say that
an exuberance equilibrium exists. In our exuberance equilibria, all agents
would be better oﬀ if the judgement variable were not being used, but as it
is being used, no agent wishes to discontinue its use. We view this as a Nash
equilibrium in beliefs.
1.3 Near-rationality
Our Nash equilibrium does not correspond exactly to a rational expectations
equilibrium. This is because the judgement variable is assumed to be unavail-
able in the statistical part of the forecasting. We think of this as reﬂecting
the separation of the econometric forecasting unit from the actual decision
makers. Decision makers treat the econometric forecast as an input to which
they are free to add the judgement variable. The judgementally adjusted
forecasts are the basis for the decisions and actions of the agents, but the
adjustments are not observables directly available to the econometricians.
In other words, we are assuming that the judgement variable is not one
that can be extracted by the econometric forecasting unit and converted into
a statistical time series that can formally be utilized in an econometric fore-
casting model. In a similar vein the decision makers face a dichotomy in
their use of judgement: they either incorporate the variable as an add-factor
or they ignore it and directly use the econometric forecast. This inability of
the decision makers to transmit to the econometric forecasters in a quanti-
tative way the judgemental aspects behind their ﬁnal economic decisions is
the source of the deviation from full rational expectations and the reason for
3
our use of the term “near-rationality.”4
1.4 Main findings
We isolate conditions under which exuberance equilibria exist in widely-
studied dynamic frameworks in which the state of the system depends on
expectations of future endogenous variables. We study two applications of
a general linear model, a simple univariate asset-pricing model as well as
the canonical New Keynesian model of Woodford (2003) and Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler (1999). We interpret the exuberance equilibrium in the asset-
pricing model as an example of “excess volatility.” In the New Keynesian
application, the exuberance equilibria can also exhibit considerable volatility
relative to the underlying fundamental rational expectations equilibrium in
which judgement does not play a role.5
Our results may lead one to view the possibility of exuberance equilibria
as particularly worrisome, as exuberance equilibria may exist even in other-
wise benign circumstances. In particular, we show that exuberance is a clear
possibility even in the case where the underlying rational expectations equi-
librium is unique (a.k.a. determinate). Thus an interesting and novel ﬁnding
is the possibility of “sunspot-like” equilibria, but without requiring that the
underlying rational expectations equilibrium of the model is indeterminate.6
In a sense, we ﬁnd “sunspot-like” equilibria without indeterminacy.
4
The term “near rationality” has been used elsewhere in the literature, often to mean
less-than-full maximization of utility. See, for example, Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and
Caballero (1995). Ball (2000) analyzes a model where the agents use a forecasting model
that does not encompass the equilibrium law of motion–a “restricted perception.” Our
concept is based on full optimization but subject to the restriction that some information
is not quantiﬁable–“judgement.” Our concept of near rationality is discussed further in
Section 2.9.
5
“Exuberance” (which in our equilibria leads to both positive and negative deviations
from the fundamentals solution) has a long informal tradition as a potential explanation of
asset price “bubbles.” For its possible role in “ﬁnancial fragility” see Lagunoﬀ and Schreft
(1999).
6
Indeterminacy and sunspot equilibria are distinct concepts, as discussed in Benhabib
and Farmer (1999). We consider only linear models, for which the existence of station-
ary sunspot equilibria requires indeterminacy–see for example Propositions 2 and 3 of
Chiappori and Guesnerie (1991).
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In the policy-oriented New Keynesian application, our ﬁndings suggest a
new danger for policy makers: Choosing policy to induce determinacy and
learnability may not be enough, because the policy maker must also avoid
the prospect of exuberance equilibria.7 We show how policy may be designed
to avoid this danger. More speciﬁcally, in the cases we study, policy that is
more aggressive than the requirements for determinacy and learnability is
needed to avoid the possibility of exuberance equilibria.
1.5 Organization
We begin in the next section with a scalar case, which is simple enough to
illustrate our main ideas analytically. We provide results on existence of
exuberance equilibria. At the end of this section we interpret the scalar case
as a simple asset pricing model, provide some simple quantitative analysis of
the excess volatility associated with exuberance and discuss further the issue
of near-rationality. We then turn to a multivariate linear framework. There
we provide an analysis of some additional issues that arise, and discuss the
concept of approximate exuberance equilibria. This section includes the New
Keynesian macroeconomics application. The concluding section contains a
summary of our ﬁndings and suggests some directions for additional research.
2 Economies with judgement
2.1 A scalar linear model
2.1.1 Overview
Our results depend on the idea that agents participating in macroeconomic
systems are learning using recursive algorithms, and that the systems un-
der learning eventually converge. In many cases, as discussed extensively in
7
For discussions of determinacy and learnability as desiderata for the evaluation of
monetary policy rules, see Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Evans and Honkapohja (2003a).
For a survey see Evans and Honkapohja (2003b).
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Evans and Honkapohja (2001), this convergence would be to a rational ex-
pectations equilibrium. The crucial aspect for the present paper is that once
agents have their macroeconometric forecast from their regression model, the
forecast is then judgementally adjusted.
To ﬁx ideas, consider an economy which may be described by
y
t
= βye
t+1
+ u
t
(1)
where y
t
is the economy’s state variable, β is a scalar parameter, and u
t
is
a stochastic noise term. For convenience we have dropped any constants in
this equation. The term ye
t+1
represents the possibly non-rational expectation
of private sector agents. The novel feature of this paper is that we allow
judgement, ξ
t
, to be added to the macroeconometric forecast, E
t
y
t+1
,
ye
t+1
= E
t
y
t+1
+ ξ
t
. (2)
Our goal is to understand the implications of this add-factor judgement on
the nature of equilibrium in the economy, and on the convergence of the
learning algorithm to equilibrium. We stress that if the judgement vector is
null, the model corresponds to a version of systems analyzed extensively in
Evans and Honkapohja (2001), and that the conditions for convergence to
rational expectations equilibrium in that case are well-established.
2.1.2 The nature of judgemental adjustment
We ﬁrst discuss how we model the judgemental add-factor. We view this
as an attempt to allow for the impact of occasional unique events. Let η
t
represent “news” about qualitative events judged to have signiﬁcant impact
on the economy, where η
t
measures that part of the anticipated impact on
y
t+1
that is believed not to be reﬂected in E
t
y
t+1
. The forecasted future
impact of this news is
∂y
t+1+j
∂η
t
= ψ
t,j
, for j = 1, 2, 3, . . .
Since we are here concerned with the judgemental adjustment, ψ
t,j
η
t
mea-
sures the judgemental forecaster’s view about the extent to which this news
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about qualitative events will fail to be reﬂected over time in the econometric
forecast.
We think of η
t
as pertaining to “unique” events and it has two compo-
nents: (i) the expected eﬀect of new qualitative events and (ii) new informa-
tion about recent qualitative events that still have an impact on the economy.
Since η
t
represents news we assume it to be a martingale diﬀerence sequence
(which for convenience we will take to be white noise). It might often take
the value zero.
The future impact ψ
t,j
of η
t
could in general have a complex time proﬁle
that reﬂects speciﬁc features of the unique qualitative events. For analytical
simplicity only we make the assumption
ψ
t,j
= ρj with 0 < ρ < 1,
that is, constant geometric decay at rate ρ for all t, j. Then
ξ
t
=
∑
∞
j=0
ψ
t−j,j
η
t−j
=
∑
∞
j=0
ρjη
t−j
= (1− ρL)−1η
t
and the total judgemental adjustment in ye
t+1
satisﬁes
(1− ρL) ξ
t
= η
t
(3)
or equivalently ξ
t
= ρξ
t−1
+ η
t
. Here L is the lag operator such that Ly
t
=
y
t−1
. Thus the expected eﬀects of the judgemental variables on y
t+1
can be
summarized as ρξ
t−1
, the expected impact of past news, plus η
t
, the impact
of current news.
While the AR(1) form of ξ
t
is convenient for our analysis, the judgemental
forecasters would resist any attempt by the econometricians to reduce it to a
measurable variable since they would not think it appropriate to treat past
qualitative events as similar to current qualitative events, that is, they would
regard it as a mistake to treat past judgments as a useful econometric time
series.
We assume that u
t
and η
t
evolve independently, so that the judgement
variable has no fundamental eﬀect on the economy described by equation
(1). This is obviously an important and extreme assumption but it is also
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the one that we think is the most interesting for the purpose of illustrating
our main points, as it is the starkest case. Later in this section, we show
that no substantive changes to our results are introduced when η
t
and u
t
are
correlated.
2.1.3 Econometric forecasts
We now turn to the nature of the macroeconometric forecast. The hallmark
of the recursive learning literature is the assignment of a perceived law of
motion to the agents, so that we can view them as using recursive algorithms
to update their forecasts of the future based on actual data produced by the
system in which they operate.8 A key aspect of this assignment is to keep
the perceived law of motion consistent with the actual law of motion of the
system, which will be generated by the interaction of equation (1) with the
agents’ expectations formation process. With judgement in the model, it will
be apparent below that the ARMA(1,1) perceived law of motion
y
t
= by
t−1
+ v
t
− av
t−1
, (4)
can be consistent with the actual law of motion. Here |b| < 1 and |a| < 1 are
parameters and v
t
is a stochastic noise term. We can write this as
y
t
= θ (L) v
t
, (5)
where
θ (L) =
1− aL
1− bL
.
Then
E
t
y
t+1
= by
t
− av
t
= [bθ (L)− a] v
t
(6)
is the minimum mean square error forecast based on this perceived law of
motion. We call (6) the econometric forecast. It is based on the econometric
8
We can think of this as corresponding to the existence of a forecasting community using
econometric-based models to guide the expectations of private sector and governmental
agents. Forecasting communities like this exist in all industrialized nations. Our analysis
diﬀers from but is related to the literature in ﬁnance on strategic professional forecasting,
see e.g. Ottaviani and Sørensen (2004) and the references therein.
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model, the perceived law of motion, alone, and is the traditional description
of the expectations formation process both under rational expectations and
in the learning literature.
2.1.4 Exuberance equilibrium
Since expectations in the economy are being formed via equation (2), and
since these expectations aﬀect the evolution of the economy’s state through
equation (1), we deduce an actual law of motion for this system. The forecast
(2) means that the economy evolves according to
y
t
= βye
t+1
+ u
t
= β
(
b− a
1− bL
)
v
t
+
β
1− ρL
η
t
+ u
t
= β
(
b− a
1− bL
)(
1− bL
1− aL
)
y
t
+
β
1− ρL
η
t
+ u
t
.
Solving for y
t
implies that the actual law of motion is
y
t
=
1− aL
β (a− b) + 1− aL
(
β
1− ρL
η
t
+ u
t
)
. (7)
Judgement naturally inﬂuences the evolution of the state because it inﬂuences
the views of economic actors concerning the future. The critical question is
then whether there are conditions under which the agents would continue to
use the add-factored forecast (2) when the economy is evolving according to
equation (7). That is, could the agents come to perceive that the judgement
variable is in fact useful in forecasting the state variable, even though by
construction there is no fundamental relationship? Our main purpose in this
paper is to answer this question.
In order to guide our thinking on this question, we deﬁne the concept of
an exuberance equilibrium and seek to understand the conditions under which
such an equilibrium would exist. An exuberance equilibrium is one in which
the evolution of the judgement variable inﬂuences actual economic outcomes,
even though there may be no fundamental impact of the judgement factor.
9
Our concept has three key components, all of which are discussed in detail
in the subsections below. The ﬁrst is that the econometric forecast should
be consistent with the data generated by the model. In some sense, the
econometric model should not be falsiﬁable. To impose this condition, we use
the CEE concept.9 The second component is that each individual agent in the
economy should conclude that it is in their interests to judgementally adjust
their forecast, given that all other agents are making a similar judgemental
adjustment. That is, inclusion of the judgemental adjustment is actually
beneﬁcial from the point of view of each agent in the economy. The third
component is that the stationary outcome is stable in the learning process
being used by the agents. That is, since our systems are based on the idea
that agents are using regression models for macroeconomic forecasting, we
need to verify that the dynamic system created by their recursive estimation
procedure is locally convergent to the proposed exuberance equilibrium.
An exuberance equilibrium can now be deﬁned. Given the model with
judgement (1), (3), (6), and (2), an exuberance equilibrium exists if
1. A CEE exists,
2. Individual agents rationally decide to include the (non-trivial) judge-
ment variable in their forecasts given that all other agents are judge-
mentally adjusting their forecasts, and
3. The CEE is learnable.
Are there conditions under which an exuberance equilibrium could exist?
There are, and we argue that the conditions are in fact worrisomely plausible.
In order to obtain some intuition, we turn to an analysis of each of the above
conditions in the scalar model.
9
As noted above, CEE and rational expectations equilibrium with limited information
are equivalent in our linear settings.
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2.2 Consistent expectations
The core idea of a CEE is that the econometric forecasters should see no dif-
ference between their perceived law of motion for how the economy evolves
and the actual data from the economy. One way to develop conditions under
which such an outcome may occur is to require that the autocovariance gen-
erating function of the perceived law of motion corresponds exactly to the
autocovariance generating function of the actual law of motion.10 We can
analytically verify the existence of a solution to the equation implied by this
statement for the univariate case.
The autocovariance generating function for the perceived law of motion
in the scalar case is given by
G
PLM
(z) = σ2
v
(1− az) (1− az−1)
(1− bz) (1− bz−1)
(8)
where σ2
v
is the variance of v, and z is a complex scalar.11 For the actual law
of motion, or ALM, the autocovariance generating function is the sum of two
such functions
G
ALM
(z) = G
η
(z) +G
u
(z)
by the independence of η and u. These functions are
G
η
(z) =
σ2
η
β2 (1− az) (1− az−1)
[β (a− b) + 1− az] [β (a− b) + 1− az−1] (1− ρz) (1− ρz−1)
,
and
G
u
(z) =
σ2
u
(1− az) (1− az−1)
[β (a− b) + 1− az] [β (a− b) + 1− az−1]
.
We use these functions to demonstrate the following result in Appendix A.
Lemma 1 There exists a CEE with b = ρ and a ∈ [0, ρ] .
10
See Hommes and Sorger (1998), Hommes, Sorger, and Wagener (2004) and Branch
and McGough (2005).
11
See Brockwell and Davis (1991, pp. 417-420), or Hamilton (1994, pp. 266-268).
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As also shown in Appendix A, there are interesting limiting cases: when
σ2
η
→ 0, so that the relative variance of the judgement process is small, a→ ρ,
while for σ2
u
→ 0, meaning that the relative variance of the fundamental
process is small, a → 0. Thus the value of a depends in an interesting way
on the relative innovation variance R ≡ σ2
η
/σ2
u
, as well as the discount factor
β and the serial correlation ρ. Since a solution a ∈ [0, ρ] always exists,12 the
conditions for a CEE can always be met in the scalar case.
We now ask whether individual rationality holds with respect to inclusion
of the judgement variable in making forecasts.
2.3 Incentives to include judgement
When all agents in the model are making use of the judgementally adjusted
forecast described in equation (2), they induce an actual law of motion for
the system which is described by equation (7). An individual agent may
nevertheless decide that it is possible to make more eﬃcient forecasts by
simply ignoring the judgemental adjustment. If this is possible, then it is not
individually rational for all agents to use the add-factored forecast. We check
this individual forecast eﬃciency condition by comparing the variance of the
forecast error for the judgemental forecast (2) to the variance of the forecast
error with judgement not included, the econometric forecast (6), under the
condition that all other agents are using the judgementally adjusted forecast
and thus are inducing the actual law of motion (7).
To make this calculation, we use the condition from the consistent ex-
pectations calculation that b = ρ. We then note that v
t
=
(
1−ρL
1−aL
)
y
t
. The
econometric forecast is therefore given by
E
t
y
t+1
=
ρ− a
1− ρL
v
t
=
ρ− a
1− aL
y
t
(9)
12
Appendix A also makes it clear that there is a second, negative value of a that equates
the two autocovariance generating functions. We found that the other conditions for
exuberance equilibrium are not met at this value of a, and we refer to it only in passing
in the remainder of the paper.
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whereas the judgementally adjusted forecast is given by
ye
t+1
=
ρ− a
1− aL
y
t
+
1
1− ρL
η
t
. (10)
The question from an (atomistic) individual agent’s point of view is then
whether they should use (9) or (10) as a basis for their expectations of the
future state of the economy.
Is it possible for the variance of the judgementally adjusted forecast to
be lower than the variance of the econometric forecast? It is. Consider the
special case when σ2
η
→ 0 so that the positive root a→ ρ. Then it is shown
in Appendix B that, apart from additive terms in u
t
that are identical for
the two forecasts, the forecast error without judgement is
FE
NJ
=
β
1− ρL
η
t+1
whereas the forecast error with judgement is
FE
J
=
β
(
1− β−1L
)
1− ρL
η
t+1
.
Thus, as σ2
η
→ 0 the ratio between the variances of these two forecast errors
is13
V ar[FE
J
]
V ar[FE
NJ
]
= 1 + β−2 − β−1ρ.
This is less than one if and only if
ρβ >
1
2
. (11)
By continuity, it follows that if β > 1/2 there are non-trivial judgement
processes (with ρ > 1/2β and σ2
η
> 0 suﬃciently small) for which the agents
have incentives to include the process as an add factor in their forecasts. The
preceding argument considered the limiting case a→ ρ, but as we will show
below, it is not necessary for a to be close to ρ for our results to hold.
13
See, for instance, Harvey (1981, p. 40). The variance of x
t
= [(1 +mL) / (1− L)] 
t
is
[(
1 +m
2
+ 2m
)
/
(
1− 
2
)]
σ
2

.
13
We conclude that individuals will decide to use the judgementally ad-
justed forecast in cases where ρ is relatively large, meaning that the serial
correlation in the judgement variable is substantial, and when β is simultane-
ously relatively high, meaning that expectations are relatively important in
determining the evolution of the economy. We remark that these conditions
are exactly the ones that correspond to the most likely scenario for the asset
pricing example given below.
Another, polar opposite, special case is one where σ2
u
→ 0 so that the
positive root a→ 0. Then
FE
NJ
=
β
1− ρβ
η
t+1
whereas
FE
J
=
β
(1− ρβ)
(
1− β−1L
)
(1− ρL)
η
t+1
.
The diﬀerence between the variances of these two forecast errors is then
V ar[FE
J
]− V ar[FE
NJ
] =
((
β−1 − ρ
)
2
1− ρ2
)
σ2
η
.
This can never be less than zero under maintained assumptions. We con-
clude that it cannot be individually rational for agents to use a judgemen-
tally adjusted forecast in the scalar case when the relative variance of the
judgemental variable is very large.
By continuity we deduce from these two special cases that there are values
of R = σ2
η
/σ2
u
∈ (0,∞) such that a ∈ (0, ρ) and agents rationally choose to
use a judgementally adjusted forecast, given that all other agents are doing
so.14 The conclusion that it can be optimal to judgementally adjust the
econometric forecast is striking since this forecast already reﬂects the eﬀects
of judgement on the time series properties of the observable variables. By
construction, the econometric forecast is the best forecasting model based on
observable information.
14
The case with a ≈ ρ is a near-common factor representation of the time series, but the
required variances remain continuous in the parameters, as can be seen from the formulae
in Appendix B.
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Value of a(R)
V
[F
E
J]
,V
[F
E
N
J]
0.01 0.12 0.23 0.34 0.45 0.56 0.67 0.78 0.89
Figure 1.  Including Judgement.
Scalar case.
Figure drawn for ß=.9, rho=.9.
V[FENJ]
V[FEJ]
Figure 1: The variance of the forecast error, with (FEJ) and without (FENJ)
judgement. The variance can be lower with judgement included, even for
values of a far from ρ.
To illustrate the point that the individual rationality constraint can be
met even when a is substantially less than ρ, we consider a numerical example.
The forecast error variances in the general case involve the variance of an
ARMA(2, 2) process. We show how to compute this variance in Appendix
B, and illustrate the ﬁndings in Figure 1.
The Figure is drawn for β = .9 and ρ = .9, which corresponds to what
might be regarded as a realistic case. The variances of the forecast errors
with and without judgement are plotted on the vertical axis, while the value
of a is plotted on the horizontal axis. Each value of a between zero and
ρ corresponds to a diﬀerent relative variance R = σ2
η
/σ2
u
, and larger values
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of R are associated with smaller values of a.15 We have already seen from
the examination of special cases that as R → ∞, a → 0 and we expect
the forecast error variance of the econometric forecast to be smaller. This
result is borne out in the Figure. In addition, we expect the variance of
the judgementally adjusted forecast to be lower when R→ 0, in which case
a → ρ. This is also borne out in the Figure. But the Figure also shows
intermediate cases, and indicates that a does not have to be particularly
close to ρ for the individual rationality condition to be met. In fact, the two
forecast error variances are equal at a ≈ .21, which is far from the value of ρ
in this example, which is .9. We conclude that the conditions for exuberance
equilibria to exist are quite likely to be met for a wide range of relative
variances R provided both β and ρ are relatively close to one.
This intuition can be partially veriﬁed by checking cases where β and ρ
are not so large. Based on condition (11), one might conjecture that the
individual rationality constraint is binding at values ρβ < 1/2. In fact, at
ρ = .7 and β = .7, an exercise like the one behind Figure 1 shows that there
are no values of a that make the judgementally adjusted forecast preferable
to the econometric forecast.
2.4 Learnability
Since we have made an assumption that the econometricians in the model
are learning using recursive algorithms, we also need to impose learnability
of any proposed equilibrium as a condition for plausibility. We study the sta-
bility of the system under learning following the literature on least squares
learning in which the economic agents making forecasts are assumed to em-
ploy econometric models with parameters updated over time as new data
becomes available.16 The standard way to analyze systems under learning
is to employ results on recursive algorithms such as recursive least squares.
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To draw Figure 1, we consider changes in R resulting from changes in σ
2
u
with σ
2
η
ﬁxed.
16
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) gives a systematic treatment of adaptive learning and
its implications in macroeconomics. Evans and Honkapohja (1999), Marimon (1997) and
Sargent (1993, 1999) provide surveys of the ﬁeld.
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In many applications it can be shown that there is convergence to ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium, provided the equilibrium satisﬁes a stability
condition.
In the current context, the CEE formulated above takes the form of an
ARMA(1,1) process. Estimation of ARMA(1,1) processes is usually done us-
ing maximum likelihood techniques, taking us beyond standard least squares
estimation. Recursive maximum likelihood (RML) algorithms are available
and they have formal similarities to recursive least squares estimation.17 Be-
cause this technical analysis is relatively unfamiliar, we conﬁne the formal
details to Appendix D.2. However, the results are easily summarized. Let a
t
and b
t
denote estimates at time t of the coeﬃcients of the ARMA forecast
function (6). Numerical computations using RML indicate convergence of
(a
t
, b
t
) to (a, ρ), where a > 0 is the CEE value given in Lemma 1. Thus this
CEE is indeed stable under learning. Moreover, in Section 2.5 we state a
formal convergence result as part of our existence theorem.
2.5 Existence and properties of equilibrium
We now collect the various results above. The following theorem gives the
key results about existence of an exuberance equilibrium in the univariate
model and characterizes its asymptotic variance:
Theorem 2 Consider the univariate model with judgement and suppose that
β > 1/2. Then
(i) for appropriate AR(1) judgement processes there exists an exuberance
equilibrium and
(ii) the exuberance equilibrium has a higher asymptotic variance than the
rational expectations equilibrium.
Proof. (i) The preceding analysis has veriﬁed that the conditions 1 and 2
for an exuberance equilibrium deﬁned in Section 2.1.4 are met for all σ2
η
> 0
17
They are also called Recursive Prediction Error (RPE) algorithms–see Evans and
Honkapohja (1994) and Marcet and Sargent (1995) for other uses of RPE methods in
learning.
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suﬃciently small. In Appendix D it is proved that condition 3 also holds,
that is, the CEE is stable under RML learning, when σ2
η
> 0 is suﬃciently
small.
(ii) The rational expectations equilibrium for the univariate model is y
t
=
u
t
since 0 < β < 1 and u
t
is iid with mean zero. The exuberance equilibrium
with a > 0 can be represented as the ARMA(1,1) process y
t
= ρy
t−1
+
v
t
− av
t−1
where a solves equation (28) given in Appendix A. From (27) of
Appendix A it can be seen that
σ2
v
=
ρ
a(β(a− ρ) + 1)
σ2
u
> σ2
u
since a < ρ and 0 < β, ρ < 1. Next, using the formula for the variance of an
ARMA(1,1) process we have
σ2
y
=
1 + a2 − 2ρa
1− ρ2
σ2
v
and since 1+a
2
−2ρa
1−ρ
2
> 1, the result follows.
The theorem states that in an exuberance equilibrium, the variance of
the state variable y
t
is larger than it would be in a fundamental rational
expectations equilibrium. This is because the REE has y
t
= u
t
, so that
σ2
y
= σ2
u
, but in an exuberance equilibrium σ2
y
> σ2
u
.
2.6 An asset pricing example
A simple univariate example of the framework (1) is given by the standard
present value model of asset pricing. A convenient way of obtaining the key
structural equation can be based on the quadratic heterogeneous agent model
of Brock and Hommes (1998). In their framework agents are myopic mean-
variance maximizers who choose the quantity of riskless and risky assets in
their portfolio to maximize expected value of a quadratic utility function of
end of period wealth.
We modify their framework to allow for shocks to the supply of the risky
asset. For convenience we assume homogeneous expectations and constant
18
known dividends. The temporary equilibrium is given by
pe
t+1
+ d−R
f
p
t
= s
t
,
where d is the dividend, p
t
is the price of the asset and R
f
> 1 is the rate of
return factor on the riskless asset. Here s
t
is a linear function of the random
supply of the risky asset per investor, assumed i.i.d. for simplicity.18 Deﬁning
y
t
= p
t
− p¯, where s¯ = Es
t
and p¯ = (d − s¯)/(R
f
− 1), we obtain (1) with
β = R−1
f
and u
t
= −R−1
f
(s
t
− s¯). We assume that 0 < β < 1.
The univariate equation (1) is a benchmark model of asset pricing and
there are, of course, alternative ways to derive the same equation. Because
0 < β < 1 the model is said to be regular or determinate, that is, under
rational expectations there is a unique nonexplosive solution, given by the
“fundamentals” solution y
t
= u
t
. In particular, under rational expectations,
sunspot solutions do not exist.
Theorem 2 shows that the basic asset pricing model is consistent with ex-
cess volatility. If investors incorporate judgemental factors that are strongly
serially correlated, they will ﬁnd that this improves their forecasts, but in
an exuberance equilibrium this will also generate signiﬁcant stationary asset
price movements in excess of those associated with fundamental factors. The
stationarity of our exuberance movements is in marked contrast to the liter-
ature on rational asset price bubbles. Because the latter are explosive, the
literature on rational bubbles has been punctuated by controversy and com-
plicated by the need to construct valid tests for non-stationary bubbles. Ex-
uberance equilibria oﬀer an alternative approach to modeling bubbles within
a stationary time series framework.
2.7 Excess volatility
A natural question is whether the excess volatility associated with an exuber-
ance equilibrium is economically meaningful, or if the exuberance conditions
18
Using the notation of Brock and Hommes (1998) s
t
= aσ
2
z
st
, where σ
2
is the con-
ditional variance of excess returns (assumed constant), a is a parameter of the utility
function and z
st
is the (random) asset supply.
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Table 1. Excess Volatility
σ
ξ
/σ
u
0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00
ρ = 0.70 1.54 2.74 − −
ρ = 0.80 1.85 3.62 5.58 −
ρ = 0.90 2.70 5.82 9.11 12.43
ρ = 0.95 3.99 8.75 13.64 18.56
Table 1: Exuberance equilibria in the asset pricing model. A dash indicates
that exuberance equilibrium does not exist. The entries in the table give one
measure of the degree of excess volatility generated, namely, the ratio of the
standard deviation of y to the standard deviation of u. The model can easily
generate substantial excess volatility like that estimated by Shiller (1981).
outlined in Theorem 2 are only met for situations in which the variance σ2
y
is just trivially larger than the fundamental variance. This is not clear from
the theorem since a is itself a nonlinear function of β, ρ, and R = σ2
η
/σ2
u
. It is
also of interest to know if the excess volatility eﬀect isolated in the theorem
is large enough to be comparable to empirical estimates of the degree of ex-
cess volatility in ﬁnancial data. One famous calculation due to Shiller (1981)
put the ratio of the standard deviation of U.S. stock prices to the standard
deviation of prices based on fundamental alone at between 5 and 13.19
Table 1 provides some illustrative calculations of exuberance equilibria
for representative parameter values. In the Table, instead of considering the
relative variance R = σ2
η
/σ2
u
, we consider the perhaps more intuitive ratio of
the standard deviation of the exuberance variable to the standard deviation
of the fundamental shock σ
ξ
/σ
u
.20 Ratios of σ
ξ
/σ
u
near unity correspond to
ratios of innovation variances σ2
η
/σ2
u
on the order of 0.1 for a high degree of
serial correlation, so that the noise associated with judgement in the economy
is actually quite modest. The table gives results for several possible values
of σ
ξ
/σ
u
, ranging from 0.5 to 2.0. We examine the empirically realistic case
19
Shiller (1981) actually compared the variance of equity prices to the variance of their
ex post price (the present value of actual future dividends), but the latter must exceed
the variance of the fundamentals price under rational expectations.
20
Note that σ
2
ξ
= σ
2
η
/
(
1− ρ
2
)
.
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where the discount factor β = 0.95, and where the degree of serial correlation
ρ is relatively high, as indicated in the leftmost column. A dash in the table
indicates that an exuberance equilibrium does not exist for the indicated
parameter values. The entries in the table are a measure of excess volatility
corresponding to Shiller’s (1981) concept, namely, σ
y
/σ
u
. The results indicate
that these measures are often in the range of 5 to 13 estimated by Shiller. We
conclude based on this illustrative calculation that the model can generate
substantial excess volatility without diﬃculty. We remark that if we push
the discount factor β closer to unity, the degree of excess volatility can rise to
very high levels for high degrees of serial correlation, with σ
y
many hundreds
of times larger than σ
u
. In this sense, the model can generate arbitrarily large
amounts of excess volatility.
We again emphasize that 0 < β < 1 corresponds to the determinate
case for this model, that is, the rational expectations equilibrium is unique.
However, for 0.5 < β < 1 exuberance equilibria exist even though sunspot
equilibria do not exist. We think this feature of our ﬁndings is striking as
it means that what would normally be regarded as benign circumstances
can actually be dangerous situations, with the possibility of near-rational
exuberance.
2.8 Correlation between judgement and fundamentals
Thus far, we have assumed that the judgement variable is not intrinsically
related to the fundamentals. To widen the scope of our analysis we consider
correlation between judgement and unobserved fundamentals. In this case,
judgement can be viewed as imprecise knowledge of some unobserved shocks
that hit the economy. In this section we will show that our results are
unaﬀected by this extension.
The extended model is
y
t
= βye
t+1
+ u
t
+ w
t
, (12)
where we have added a second unobservable shock w
t
, which is assumed to
be iid and independent of u
t
for simplicity. The judgement process is still
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(3), where the “news” or innovation of the judgement process is now
η
t
= fw
t
+ ηˆ
t
. (13)
In other words, the news consists of both information on the shock w
t
as well
as extraneous noise ηˆ
t
. (We assume that w
t
and ηˆ
t
are independent.) The
latter can be interpreted either as extraneous randomness or as measurement
error of w
t
.
The formal analysis can be extended a straightforward way. The ALM
(which previously was (7)) can now be written as
y
t
=
1− aL
β (a− b) + 1− aL
[
(1− ρL)−1β(fw
t
+ ηˆ
t
) + (u
t
+ w
t
)
]
(14)
and the requirements for CEE, incentives to include judgement and learn-
ability can be modiﬁed accordingly:
Proposition 3 Consider the univariate model with judgement correlated with
fundamentals as above. If β > 1/2, then for appropriate AR(1) judgement
processes there exists an exuberance equilibrium.
Formal details are in Appendices C and D. We remark that the result
goes through with a signiﬁcant degree of correlation between the economic
fundamental u
t
+ w
t
and the judgement innovation η
t
(see Appendix C).
2.9 Further discussion of near rationality
Our exuberance equilibrium is near-rational but not fully rational. There are
two ways in which we have imposed assumptions that deviate from full ra-
tionality. First, the judgement process ξ
t
is assumed not directly available to
(or usable by) econometric forecasters, who rely purely on the observables y
t
.
This seems realistic because ξ
t
represents the impact of “unique” qualitative
events. More speciﬁcally, ξ
t
is the adjustment the judgemental forecasters
believe is appropriate to make to the econometric forecast. This procedure
thus reﬂects a natural division of labor in which the econometricians produce
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the best statistical forecast based on the observable variables of interest, and
the judgemental forecasters modify these forecasts as they think appropri-
ate to reﬂect additional qualitative factors. Although ξ
t
= ye
t+1
−E
t
y
t+1
may
possibly be obtainable by the econometricians (at least with a lag), we would
expect the judgemental forecasters to resist the incorporation of ξ
t
into the
econometric model.
Furthermore, older ξ
t−j
represent diﬀerent unique events, unrelated to the
current judgemental variable. Econometric models sometimes incorporate
dummy variables (or other proxies) to capture the quantitative eﬀects of
qualitative events, but as the events become more distant such variables
tend to get dropped and rolled into the unobserved random shocks in order
to preserve degrees of freedom. The impact of recent qualitative events could
be estimated by incorporating dummy variables into the econometric model,
but for forecasting purposes this would be unhelpful, and would still leave
the problem of forecasting the future impact of qualitative factors to the
judgemental forecasters.
The second way in which our exuberance equilibrium is not fully ratio-
nal is that the incentive condition is assumed dichotomous. This also seems
realistic, since its inclusion is determined by the judgemental forecaster. Fur-
thermore, econometric tests of whether “all” of ξ
t
should have been included
would (often) have low power. Suppose we allowed for just a proportion
k ∈ [0, 1] of the judgement to be included in the forecast. It can be shown
that the minimum MSE in the univariate case occurs at k = βρ, where for an
exuberance equilibrium we expect 0.5 < βρ < 1. For βρ near one, rationality
tests using
y
t+1
− ye
t+1
= (1− k) ξ
t
+ ζ
t+1
(15)
of the null hypothesis H
0
: k = 1, would have low power, and consider-
able data would be required to detect that not all of ξ
t
should be optimally
included.
We illustrate this point in Table 2, which takes into account both points
just discussed. Suppose that econometricians do have access ex post to the
judgementally adjusted forecasts ye
t+1
, and therefore to ξ
t
= ye
t+1
− E
t
y
t+1
,
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Table 2. Test rejection rates
ρ
0.7 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 0.99
n = 120 47.6 5.1 0.1 0 0.4 2.0
n = 240 86.8 15.9 1.4 0 0.4 1.7
n = 480 99.7 48.0 3.5 0 0.4 1.0
Table 2: Exuberance equilibria in the asset pricing model. Percent of test
rejections at 5 percent level of the null hypothesis that including judgement is
fully rational, that is, Ho: k=1. Results given are based on 1000 replications.
and that they estimate (15) and test the null hypothesis H
0
: k = 1 that the
inclusion of judgement is fully rational. For the purposes of this test we set
the discount factor at β = 1− 0.05/12 = 0.9958 in line with a real monthly
risk-free rate of return of 0.05/12.21 We also set σ2
ξ
/σ2
u
= 1.0. The three
sample sizes shown correspond to 10, 20 and 40 years of monthly data and
the nominal signiﬁcance level of the test is set at 5%. When ρ is below 0.8 one
would expect to eventually detect a deviation from full rationality. However
it can be seen that for ρ at or above 0.85, rejection of the null is unlikely even
with 40 years of data. In particular, for ρ = 0.9 or ρ = 0.95 any deviation of
the judgmental forecasts from full rationality would be virtually undetectable
except with enormous sample sizes. Furthermore, these cases correspond
to large, empirically plausible values of excess volatility: for the parameter
settings of Table 2 we have excess volatility measures of σ
y
/σ
u
= 8.40 for
ρ = 0.9 and σ
y
/σ
u
= 16.39 for ρ = 0.95.
From Table 2 we see that, for an exuberance equilibrium with ρ values
above 0.85, decision makers are likely to conclude that the functional division
of labor between econometricians, who supply forecasts based on the observ-
able variable y
t
, and judgemental forecasters, who adjust these forecasts to
take account of perceived qualitative events omitted from the econometric
model, is entirely appropriate. Because an exuberance equilibrium is a CEE,
21
In the Brock and Hommes (1998) set-up, β is the inverse of the risk-free real rate-of-
return factor. The value chosen here corresponds to an annual discount rate of 5% p.a.,
but the results of Table 2 are quite similar if 3% p.a. (or 7% p.a.) is used.
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the econometricians are fully taking into account the predictable serial cor-
relation properties of the variable being forecast. At the same time, the
mean square forecast error is smaller for the judgemental forecasts than for
the pure econometric forecast, and thus there is a clear gain to forecast per-
formance in making use of the judgemental adjustment. Furthermore, for
suﬃciently serially correlated judgement processes, econometric tests of the
forecast errors would not detect any deviation from full rationality of the
judgementally adjusted forecasts. Exuberance equilibria thus appear to be
plausible outcomes in the asset pricing model.
The uniqueness of qualitative events is also relevant to the issue at hand.
Suppose, for example, that ρ = 0.8 and that rationality tests eventually
indicate a statistically signiﬁcant deviation from full rationality, with an es-
timated value near k = 0.8. It does not really seem plausible that forecasters
would decide to downweight current judgemental adjustments, based on the
ﬁnding that such adjustments over the last 20 years or so have been about
20% too high, since past judgemental adjustments mainly concerned diﬀer-
ent qualitative events, and since the adjustments may have been made by
diﬀerent judgemental forecasters. Furthermore, even if on this basis cur-
rent judgement is downweighted, and even if this eventually results in the
role of judgement being gradually extinguished over time, a new qualitative
event will at some point suggest the need once again for judgement, with
the judgement process again becoming persistent. In this sense, an economy
in which exuberance equilibria exist always remains “subject to judgement.”
An economy subject to judgement contrasts strongly with an economy that
is nonexuberant. In the latter case there is no incentive to include judge-
ment, since unadjusted econometric forecasts have lower mean-square error,
whether or not other agents include judgement.
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3 The multivariate case
3.1 The linear framework
The basic features of the univariate analysis extend directly to the multivari-
ate case. We again have
y
t
= βye
t+1
+ u
t
(16)
where now y
t
is a vector of the economy’s state variables, β is a conformable
matrix of parameters, and u
t
is a vector of stochastic noise terms. The
judgement vector in the economy follows
(I − ρL) ξ
t
= η
t
where I is a conformable identity matrix, ρ is a conformable matrix with
roots inside the unit circle, ξ
t
is a vector of judgement variables, and η
t
is a
vector of stochastic noise terms.
One change we make to the analysis in the multivariate setting is that
we now endow the agents with laws of motion that take the form of a
VAR(p) process. Recalling that in the univariate case an exact CEE is an
ARMA(1,1) process, we might hypothesize that the CEE would take the form
of a VARMA (vector ARMA) process in the multivariate case. However, this
is formally diﬃcult to verify. In any event VARMA procedures are not widely
used and in practice the standard forecasting tool in multivariate settings is
estimation of a VAR. We will show that a VAR(p) process cannot deliver an
exact CEE, but for large values of p we will obtain close approximations.
The PLM is therefore speciﬁed as
y
t
=
p∑
i=1
b
i
y
t−i
+ v
t
, (17)
where y
t
, v
t
are n × 1 vectors, the b
i
are n × n matrices and Ey′
t−i
v
t
= 0
for i = 1, . . . , p. This leads to econometric forecasts E
t
y
t+1
=
∑
p−1
i=0
b
i+1
y
t−i
,
and to the judgementally adjusted forecasts
ye
t+1
=
p−1∑
i=0
b
i+1
y
t−i
+ ξ
t
.
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The ALM is thus
y
t
= (I − βb
1
)−1
{
p−1∑
i=1
βb
i+1
y
t−i
+ βξ
t
+ u
t
}
. (18)
It is easily veriﬁed that the ALM is a VARMA(p,1) process and this is the
sense in which the VAR(p) PLM can only give an approximate CEE.
Let b = (b
1
, . . . , b
p
) and let P [y
t
|Y
t−1
] = T (b)′Y
t−1
be the linear projection
of y
t
on Y
t−1
where Y ′
t−1
= (y′
t−1
, . . . , y′
t−p
). Using standard results on linear
projections,
T (b) =
(
Ey
t
Y ′
t−1
)
(EY
t−1
Y ′
t−1
)−1. (19)
An approximate CEE is deﬁned as a value b¯ that satisﬁes the equation b¯ =
T (b¯). We require also that all roots of det(I −
∑
p
i=1
b
i
Li) = 0 lie outside the
unit circle so that y
t
is a stationary process. In an approximate CEE, for each
variable the forecast errors v
t
of the econometric forecasters have the property
that they are orthogonal to Y ′
t−1
. It follows that the agents are “getting
right” all of the ﬁrst p autocovariances of the y
t
process. For a stationary
process the autocovariances Ey
t
y
t−j
→ 0 as j → ∞ and thus stationary
ﬁxed points b¯ deliver approximate CEE in the sense that as p becomes large
the econometric forecasters neglect only high order autocovariances that are
vanishingly small.
To compute T (b) one can write the system in ﬁrst order form
z
t
= Bz
t−1
+D
(
u
t
η
t
)
with z
t
= (Y
′
t
, ξ
t
)′. The relevant values for
(
Ey
t
Y ′
t−1
)
and (EY
t−1
Y ′
t−1
) can
be obtained from the equation
vec(Var(z
t
)) = [I −B ⊗B]−1 vec(D
[
Var
(
u
t
η
t
)]
D′).
Here Var (z
t
) is the covariance matrix of z
t
, vec(K) is the vectorization of a
matrix K and ⊗ is the Kronecker product. The equilibrium b¯ can then be
calculated by the E-stability algorithm
b
s
= b
s−1
+ γ(T (b
s−1
)− b
s−1
), (20)
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where γ is chosen to be a small positive constant.
This procedure will automatically give us learnable equilibria in the fol-
lowing sense. The econometricians are estimating a VAR(p) PLM for y
t
and
are assumed to update their parameter estimates over time using recursive
least squares (RLS). As previously explained, the decision makers add their
judgemental adjustment to the econometricians’ forecast and, together with
the variable u
t
, the current value of y
t
is determined. The vector T (b) denotes
the true coeﬃcients projection for a given forecast coeﬃcients b. Under RLS
learning it can be shown that the estimates b
t
at time t on average move in
the direction T (b
t
). Equation (20) describes this adjustment in notional time
s. Using the techniques of Evans and Honkapohja (2001), it can be shown
that RLS learning converges locally to b¯ if it is a locally asymptotically stable
ﬁxed point of (20), for suﬃciently small γ > 0. Formal details of the RLS
algorithm and learning are outlined in Appendix D.1.
Finally, we also require the condition concerning the incentives to include
judgement. In other words, under what conditions is the covariance matrix of
ye
t+1
−y
t+1
in some sense smaller than the covariance matrix ofE
t
y
t+1
−y
t+1
?22
Denote the covariance matrix without judgement as M (0) and with judge-
ment asM (1) . We will usually interpret the incentive to include judgement
condition to mean that the component by component comparison of the ma-
trices along the diagonal are all smaller forM (1). That is, we require that
M (0)
i
−M (1)
i
> 0
for all diagonal components i. By setting up the model in ﬁrst-order state
space form, and including in the state the forecast errors with and without
judgement, it is straightforward to computeM(0)−M(1) and test numeri-
cally for the existence of exuberance equilibria.
When an approximate CEE is stable under learning and satisﬁes the
incentives to include judgement, then we refer to it as an approximate exu-
berance equilibrium.
22
We implicitly are assuming that y
e
t+1
and E

t
y
t+1
have the same mean as y
t+1
, so that
variance of the forecast error is the same as the mean squared error. This will always hold
in our analysis.
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A simple illustration of an approximate exuberance equilibrium can be
given by returning to the univariate case. Using the procedure just described
we compute an AR(3) approximate CEE for β = 0.9, ρ = 0.7 and R = 1.
The exact ARMA(1,1) CEE given in Lemma 1 is b = 0.7 and a = 0.180814.
Computing the approximate AR(3) CEE using (20) we obtain
b
1
= 0.517259, b
2
= 0.0929807, b
3
= 0.0157536.
These values are fairly close approximations to the ﬁrst three terms of the
series expansion of (1− bz)/(1− az) and thus provide an approximate CEE.
Since for this solution the incentive and learnability conditions are also met,
this describes an approximate exuberance equilibrium.
Returning to the incentives issue, in the multivariate case we sometimes
refer to alternative versions of the incentives condition as a method of cate-
gorizing our results. If the individual rationality condition is met in the sense
that the diﬀerence between the two covariance matrices is a positive deﬁnite
matrix, in conjunction with the other two requirements, we say that a strong
exuberance equilibrium exists. If some diagonal components of the diﬀerence
between the two covariance matrices are positive, while others are negative,
when all other conditions are met, this means that the agents may or may
not come to the conclusion that including the judgemental adjustment is
valuable. We will refer to this case as indefinite.
Another possibility is that the diagonal components of the diﬀerence be-
tween the two covariance matrices are all negative when all other conditions
are met. In this case the agents would most likely conclude that the inclu-
sion of judgement was not valuable. We call this case one of non-exuberance.
Finally, to be complete, the diﬀerence could be a negative deﬁnite matrix in
which case we say that there is strong non-exuberance.
3.2 Exuberance and monetary policy
As an example we now study exuberance equilibria in a New Keynesian
macroeconomic model suggested by Woodford (2003) and Clarida, Gali, and
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Gertler (1999). We use a simple, three-equation version given by
x
t
= xe
t+1
− σ−1
[
r
t
− πe
t+1
]
+ u˜
x,t
, (21)
π
t
= κx
t
+ δπe
t+1
+ u˜
π,t
, (22)
r
t
= ϕ
π
π
t
+ ϕ
x
x
t
. (23)
In these equations, x
t
is the output gap, π
t
is the deviation of inﬂation from
target, and r
t
is the deviation of the nominal interest rate from the value that
is consistent with inﬂation at target and output at potential. All variables
are expressed in percentage point terms and the steady state is normalized
to zero. The terms u˜
x,t
and u˜
π,t
represent stochastic disturbances to the
economy. The parameter σ−1 is related to the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption of a representative household. The parameter κ
is related to the degree of price stickiness in the economy, and δ is the discount
factor of a representative household.23 The third equation describes the
Taylor-type policy rule in use by the policy authority, in which the parameters
ϕ
π
and ϕ
x
are assumed to be positive. In the formulation (21)-(23), only
private sector expectations aﬀect the economy.
Substituting (23) into (21) and writing the system in matrix form gives
(16) where y
t
= [x
t
, π
t
]′ , ye
t+1
=
[
xe
t+1
, πe
t+1
]
′
, u
t
= Cu˜
t
, u˜
t
= [u˜
x,t
, u˜
π,t
]′ with
covariance matrix
Σ
u
=
[
σ2
u,11
σ2
u,12
σ2
u,21
σ2
u,22
]
,
β =
1
σ + ϕ
x
+ κϕ
π
[
σ 1− δϕ
π
κσ κ+ δ (σ + ϕ
x
)
]
,
and
C =
1
σ + ϕ
x
+ κϕ
π
[
σ −ϕ
π
κσ σ + ϕ
x
]
.
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This formulation of the model is based upon individual Euler equations under (iden-
tical) private sector expectations. Other models of bounded rationality are possible, see,
for instance, Preston (2005) for a formulation in which long-horizon expectations directly
aﬀect individual behavior.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 A Taylor-type monetary policy rule
We now illustrate the possibility of approximate exuberance equilibria in the
New Keynesian model. We use Woodford’s (2003) calibration σ = 0.157,
κ = 0.024, and δ = 0.99. For the exuberance variable we assume the matrix
describing the degree of serial correlation is ρ = diag(0.99, 0.95) and Σ
η
=
diag(0.0035, 0.0035).24 The variances of the fundamental shocks are assumed
to be Σ
u˜
= diag(1.1, 0.03). No real attempt has been made to calibrate the
shocks except to choose values that, in the exuberance equilibrium, roughly
match U.S. inﬂation and output-gap variances measured in percent.
The policy parameters ϕ
π
and ϕ
x
can be varied and we are interested in
values of ϕ
π
and ϕ
x
that might be consistent with exuberance equilibrium.
Consider ϕ
π
= 1.05 and ϕ
x
= 0.05. These values satisfy the Taylor principle
and deliver a determinate rational expectations equilibrium in the usual set-
up; see Bullard and Mitra (2002). Suppose that econometricians estimate a
VAR(3). In the approximate CEE the coeﬃcients of the vector autoregression
are approximately
b
1
=
(
0.0975 −0.3319
0.0759 0.8775
)
,
b
2
=
(
0.0976 0.0108
0.0012 0.0902
)
,
and
b
3
=
(
0.0586 0.0731
−0.0037 0.0071
)
.
This corresponds to a stationary process. The output variance is approx-
imately 2.54 and the inﬂation variance is approximately 6.14. The matrix
describing the key condition for individual rationality,M(0)−M(1), is pos-
itive deﬁnite, hence the CEE is strongly exuberant. As in the scalar model
the exuberance equilibrium exhibits excess volatility. In fact, the ratio of the
output-gap standard deviation in the exuberance equilibrium to its standard
24
Somewhat lower values of the ρ parameters delivered qualitatively similar results.
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deviation in the fundamental rational expectations equilibrium is about 1.5
and for the standard deviation of inﬂation the corresponding ratio is almost
16!
In this example we can also show that a change in the Taylor-rule co-
eﬃcients can diminish the likelihood of exuberance equilibria. When ϕ
π
is
increased to 1.1 the equilibrium is no longer strongly exuberant but it does
remain exuberant. However, if ϕ
π
is increased to 1.5 and ϕ
x
is increased to
0.1, the possibility of an exuberance equilibrium is eliminated. In this sense,
a more aggressive policy tends to reduce the likelihood of an exuberance
equilibrium.
We next analyze the idea that more aggressive policy is less likely to be
associated with the existence of exuberance equilibrium more systematically.
For this, we calculate the conditions for exuberance equilibrium using the
calibration given above but allowing the Taylor rule coeﬃcients to vary. The
results are given in Figure 2, where ϕ
π
∈ (0, 1.25) and ϕ
x
∈ (0, 0.25) at
selected grid points. The open squares indicate the points where determinacy
and learnability of the rational expectations equilibrium hold for this model.25
The Figure displays the points at which exuberance equilibria exist. These
points tend to be for values of ϕ
x
less than about 0.08, and for values of ϕ
π
up to 1.25. Again, these exuberance equilibria exist in the region associated
with determinacy, and therefore can arise in parameter regions where sunspot
equilibria are ruled out.
While Figure 2 illustrates where exuberance equilibria exist in this econ-
omy, it is not comforting regarding the possibility that policymakers may
be able to choose policy parameters so as to rule out exuberance equilibria.
According to the Figure, either an exuberance equilibrium exists or the indef-
inite case arises (plain open boxes in the Figure). However, if we expand the
space of points considered, it becomes apparent that more aggressive policy
can produce situations characterized by non-exuberance. This is shown in
Figure 3, where the region of the policy parameter space has been expanded
25
The blank area to the left in this ﬁgure is associated with indeterminacy of rational
expectations equilibrium.
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Figure 2: Exuberance equilibria in the New Keynesian model. Open boxes
indicate points where the REE is determinate. Triangles indicate points
where exuberance equilibria exist.
so that ϕ
π
∈ (0, 2.5) and ϕ
x
∈ (0, 0.45) at selected grid points. In this Fig-
ure, the region associated with exuberance from Figure 2 appears near the
point (1, 0) . However, there is now a region of the policy parameter space
that is associated with non-exuberance. This part of the space involves more
aggressive reactions to both inﬂation deviations and the output gap. In this
sense, a more aggressive policy can mitigate the possibility of exuberance
equilibrium in this economy.
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Existence of Exuberance Equilibria
Figure 3: A suﬃciently aggressive Taylor-type policy is associated with non-
exuberance, denoted by open circles.
3.3.2 A forward-looking monetary policy rule
It is also of interest to investigate an alternative Taylor-type interest rate
rule,
r
t
= ϕ
π
πe
t+1
+ ϕ
x
xe
t+1
, (24)
in which policymakers react to forecasts of future values of the inﬂation
deviation and the output gap. Interest-rate rules depending on expectations
of future inﬂation and the output gap have been discussed extensively in the
monetary policy literature and are subject to various interpretations. Here we
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are assuming that the monetary authorities form forecasts in the same way as
the private sector, that is, by constructing an econometric forecast to which
they consider adding the same judgement variable. We might hope that by
reacting aggressively enough to expectations such a rule would diminish the
likelihood of exuberance equilibria. With the policy rule (24) the reduced
form system is the same except that the coeﬃcient matrices become
β =
[
1− σ−1ϕ
x
σ−1 (1− ϕ
π
)
κ (1− σ−1ϕ
x
) δ + κσ−1 (1− ϕ
π
)
]
and
C =
[
1 0
κ 1
]
.
Using the same calibration, we calculate whether the conditions for exu-
berance equilibria hold for ϕ
π
∈ (0, 3.5) and ϕ
x
∈ (0, 0.35) at selected grid
points. The results are plotted in Figure 4.26 The open squares again indicate
the points where determinacy and learnability of the rational expectations
equilibrium hold for this model.27 As with the standard Taylor-type rule,
the Figure indicates that exuberance equilibria exist near the point (1, 0).
Again, more aggressive policy delivers non-exuberance. Comparing this per-
formance to that of the contemporaneous rule, we see that non-exuberance
begins to arise for smaller values of ϕ
π
and ϕ
x
— see Figures 3 and 4. In
particular, with the forward-looking rule even very small values of ϕ
x
are
suﬃcient to yield non-exuberance if ϕ
π
is greater than (approximately) 1.8.
In this sense the performance of the forward-looking rule appears superior,
which provides one potential justiﬁcation for their use by central banks.28
We conclude that by following an explicit policy of reacting against the de-
26
There is a subtlety in this example due to the fact that the central bank has non-
negligible macroeconomic eﬀects. We assume that in comparing the performance of fore-
casts with and without judgement they compare forecasts to actual, realized, data.
27
For the forward-looking rule, indeterminacy of the fundamental rational expectations
equilibrium occurs not only in the blank area to the left in the ﬁgure, but also in the blank
area toward the top of the ﬁgure.
28
This example in Figure 4 also produces strong non-exuberance for large enough values
of ϕ
π
, approximately 3.25 or greater in this ﬁgure, depending on the value of ϕ
x
.
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Exuberance with Forward-Looking Rules
Figure 4: Suﬃciently aggressive policy is again associated with non-
exuberance when the policy rule is forward-looking.
viations of expectations from the values justiﬁed by the fundamental shocks,
monetary authorities enhance the stability of the economy.
3.3.3 Optimal monetary policy rules
Finally, we discuss optimal discretionary policy as in Evans and Honkapohja
(2003). They assign a standard quadratic objective to the policymaker with
weight α on output gap variance. They write the resulting optimal policy
as a Taylor-type rule in the expected output gap and the expected inﬂa-
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tion deviation, along with reactions to fundamental shocks in the economy.
Their policy rule delivers determinacy, and the unique stationary rational
expectations equilibrium is stable under least squares learning for all values
of structural parameters and the policy weight. We can denote this optimal
policy rule as
r
t
= ϕ
π
πe
t+1
+ ϕ
x
xe
t+1
+ ϕ
u,x
u˜
x,t
+ ϕ
u,π
u˜
π,t
. (25)
where the optimal values ϕ
x
= ϕ
u,x
= σ, and the matrices β and C become
β =
[
0 σ−1 (1− ϕ
π
)
0 δ + κσ−1 (1− ϕ
π
)
]
and
C =
[
0 −σ−1ϕ
u
0 1− σ−1κϕ
u
]
.
The relationship between ϕ
u,π
and ϕ
π
is given by ϕ
u,π
= δ−1 (ϕ
π
− 1) . This
leaves only the optimal choice of ϕ
π
, which depends on α. A small policy
weight on output gap variability α → 0 (an inﬂation hawk), is associated
with an optimal value ϕ
π
= 1 + σδκ−1 ≈ 7.47. A large weight on output
gap variability, α → ∞, (an inﬂation dove), is associated with an optimal
value ϕ
π
→ 1. Thus we can calculate whether exuberance equilibria exist
for all possible values of the policymaker weight α by choosing values for
ϕ
π
∈ (1, 7.47) .
The results of this calculation29 indicate that for values of ϕ
π
∈ (1, ϕ¯
π
)
the equilibrium is in the indeﬁnite region. For values ϕ
π
∈ (ϕ¯
π
, 7.47) , the
equilibrium is non-exuberant. The cutoﬀ value is ϕ¯
π
≈ 1.557. Thus standard
optimal policy calculations alone are not enough to ensure non-exuberance.
To move into the non-exuberance region, policymakers must have a suﬃ-
ciently small weight on output gap variability. The policy weight value asso-
ciated with ϕ
π
= 1.557 is quite low, approximately α ≈ 0.00612.More weight
than this on output gap variance implies a value for ϕ
π
that is too low, in
the sense that it places the equilibrium in the indeﬁnite region.30
29
The exact optimal policy rule would create perfect multicollinearity in this system.
To avoid this complication, we set ϕ
x
= 1.01σ, slightly higher than the optimal value.
30
If we assume that the policymaker has the same preferences as the representative
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4 Conclusions and possible extensions
We have studied how a new phenomenon, exuberance equilibria, may arise in
standard macroeconomic environments. We assume that agents are learning
in the sense that they are employing and updating econometric models used
to forecast the future values of variables they care about.31 Unhindered,
this learning process would converge to a rational expectations equilibrium
in the economies we study. We investigate the idea that decision-makers
may be tempted to include judgemental adjustments to their forecasts if
all others in the economy are similarly judgementally adjusting their fore-
casts. The judgemental adjustment, or add factor, is a pervasive and widely-
acknowledged feature of actual macroeconometric forecasting in industrial-
ized economies. We obtain conditions under which such add-factoring can
become self-fulﬁlling, altering the actual dynamics of the economy signiﬁ-
cantly, but in a way that remains consistent with the econometric model of
the agents.
In order to develop our central points we have made some strong simpli-
fying assumptions. We have assumed that the exuberance or judgement vari-
ables take a simple autoregressive form, but this assumption is mainly made
for convenience. While we do believe that judgemental adjustments exhibit
strong positive serial correlation, a more complicated stationary stochastic
process could instead be used and in principle even time varying distribu-
tions could be incorporated into our framework. The assumption of identical
judgements of diﬀerent (representative) agents is correspondingly restrictive.
Allowing for diﬀerences in judgements by individual agents would probably
make the conditions for exuberance equilibrium more diﬃcult to achieve. On
the other hand, this could create new phenomena, such as momentum eﬀects
household, we obtain a value of α ≈ .00313 at the calibrated values of Woodford (2003).
(This is calculated as κ/θ = 0.024/7.67, where θ is the parameter controlling the price
elasticity of demand.) The value of ϕ

π
for any speciﬁed α is 1+κδσ
(
α+ κ
2
)
. This would
suggest an optimal value of ϕ

π
≈ 2.0, large enough to imply non-exuberance.
31
In line with this literature, the econometric forecasts are based on reduced form mod-
els. It would also be of interest to examine the questions we have studied in the context
of econometric forecasts based on structural models.
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arising when a large fraction of agents begin to agree in their judgements.
The incorporation of judgment into decisions, in the form of adjustments
to econometric forecasts, can have a self-fulﬁlling feature in the sense that de-
cisions makers would believe ex post that their judgement had improved their
forecasts. This result is similar in spirit to the self-fulﬁlling nature of sunspot
equilibria, but with the novel feature that it can arise in determinate models
in which there is a unique rational expectations equilibrium that depends
only on fundamentals. This widens the set of models in which self-fulﬁlling
ﬂuctuations might plausibly emerge. In particular, we have shown that exu-
berance equilibria can arise in the standard asset-pricing model, generating
substantial excess volatility. Exuberance equilibria can also arise in NewKey-
nesian models, with monetary policymakers following standard interest-rate
rules, but can be eradicated if policymakers take an appropriately aggressive
stance.
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Appendices
A Conditions for CEE in the scalar case
The sum of the two functions G
η
(z) and G
u
(z) is
G
ALM
(z) =
(1− az) (1− az−1)
(1− ρz) (1− ρz−1)
×{
β2σ2
η
+ (1− ρz) (1− ρz−1) σ2
u
[β (a− b) + 1− az] [β (a− b) + 1− az−1]
}
.
It can be seen from the form of G
ALM
(z) that, for arbitrary a and b, the
ALM is an ARMA(2,2) process. As we will now show, there are choices of a
and b that yield G
PLM
(z) = G
ALM
(z). These choices of a and b also have
the property that the corresponding ALM takes an ARMA(1,1) form that
matches the PLM. This is possible if a and b are chosen so that there is a
common factor in the numerator and denominator of the expression on the
right-hand side of G
ALM
(z).
We now set G
PLM
(z) = G
ALM
(z) , under the condition that b = ρ so
that the poles of the autocovariance generating functions agree. This yields
σ2
v
[β (a− ρ) + 1− az]
[
β (a− ρ) + 1− az−1
]
=
β2σ2
η
+ (1− ρz)
(
1− ρz−1
)
σ2
u
.
This equation can be written as
σ2
v
{
[1 + β (a− ρ)]2 + a2
}
− σ2
v
a [β (a− ρ) + 1]
(
z + z−1
)
=
β2σ2
η
+ σ2
u
(
1 + ρ2
)
− σ2
u
ρ
(
z + z−1
)
.
For the autocovariances of the perceived and actual laws of motion to be
equal, the coeﬃcients on the powers of z in this equation must be equal.
Equating these we obtain the two equations
σ2
v
{
[1 + β (a− ρ)]2 + a2
}
= β2σ2
η
+ σ2
u
(
1 + ρ2
)
(26)
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and
σ2
v
a [β (a− ρ) + 1] = σ2
u
ρ. (27)
We wish to solve for a value of a such that |a| < 1. Solving equation (27) for
σ2
v
and substituting the result into equation (26), and in addition deﬁning
s ≡ β2σ2
η
+ σ2
u
(1 + ρ2) , we obtain the quadratic equation
F (a) ≡ c
2
a2 + c
1
a+ c
0
= 0 (28)
with
c
2
≡ sβ − ρ
(
1 + β2
)
σ2
u
,
c
1
≡ s (1− ρβ)− 2ρβ (1− ρβ)σ2
u
,
c
0
≡ −ρ (1− ρβ)2 σ2
u
.
We deduce that F (0) < 0, and that
F (1) = σ2
η
β2 [1 + (1− ρ)β] + σ2
u
(1− ρβ) (1 + β)
[
(ρ− 1)2
]
> 0.
These inequalities imply that there exists a positive root a ∈ [0, 1] to (28).
Moreover, it is easy to compute that F (ρ) > 0, so that the root must be less
than ρ. We also note that for σ2
η
→ 0, a = ρ solves equation (28), while for
σ2
u
→ 0, a = 0 is a solution. There can be a second, negative root. However,
our numerical results indicate that the CEE corresponding to the negative
root is not learnable.
B Judgement in the scalar case
The induced actual law of motion, as depicted in equation (7), is
y
t
=
1− aL
β (a− ρ) + 1− aL
(
β
1− ρL
η
t
+ u
t
)
. (29)
By substituting equation (29) into both (9) and (10), we can write the two
types of forecasts in terms of the shocks u
t
and η
t
. These expressions become
E
t
y
t+1
=
ρ− a
β (a− ρ) + 1− aL
(
β
1− ρL
η
t
+ u
t
)
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in the case of no judgement, and
ye
t+1
=
ρ− a
β (a− ρ) + 1− aL
(
β
1− ρL
η
t
+ u
t
)
+
1
1− ρL
η
t
in the case of the judgementally adjusted forecast. The actual state of the
economy at time t+ 1 is, from equation (29),
y
t+1
=
1− aL
β (a− ρ) + 1− aL
(
β
1− ρL
η
t+1
+ u
t+1
)
. (30)
We can therefore compute forecast errors in each of the two cases. When
computing these forecast errors, we save on clutter by ignoring the terms
involving u, as these will be the same whether or not the agent judgementally
adjusts the forecast. The forecast error in the case of no judgement can be
written as
FE
NJ
≡ [y
t+1
− E
t
y
t+1
] |
u=0
=
β
1 + β (a− ρ)
1[
1−
(
a
1+β(a−ρ)
)
L
]η
t+1
(31)
whereas in the case of a judgementally adjusted forecast it is
FE
J
≡
[
y
t+1
− ye
t+1
]
|
u=0
=
β
1 + β (a− ρ)
×
1−
(
a+ β−1
)
L+ aβ−1L2
1−
(
a+ρ[1+β(a−ρ)]
1+β(a−ρ)
)
L+
(
aρ
1+β(a−ρ)
)
L2
η
t+1
. (32)
These equations simplify to those given in the text for the case a→ ρ.
Apart from the lead coeﬃcient β/ (1 + β (a− ρ)) , each forecast error
process is in the generic class
x
t
=
1 +m
1
L+m
2
L2
1− 
1
L− 
2
L2

t
,
and the variance of x
t
is given by
V ar (x
t
) =
x
num
x
den
σ2

. (33)
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where
x
num
=
(1 + 
2
) 
1
(m
1
+m
2

1
+m
2
m
1
)
1− 
2
+
(m
1
+m
2

1
) (
1
+m
1
) +
(
1 + 2m
2

2
+m2
2
)
and
x
den
= 1−
2
1
1− 
2
−

2
2
1
1− 
2
− 2
2
.
Considering the forecast error in the case without judgement included,
equation (31), we set m
1
= m
2
= 
2
= 0 and 
1
= a/ [1 + β (a− ρ)] in
equation (33). For the case with judgement, we set
m
1
= − (1 + aβ) β−1,
m
2
= aβ−1,

1
=
a + ρ [1 + β (a− ρ)]
1 + β (a− ρ)
,

2
=
−aρ
1 + β (a− ρ)
,
and a is determined by β, ρ and R = σ2
η
/σ2
u
as described in Appendix A.
C The correlated case
The formal analysis in Appendices A and B is modiﬁed as follows. First, the
autocovariance generating function for the ALM (14) is
G
ALM
(z) =
(1− az) (1− az−1)
(1− ρz) (1− ρz−1)
×{
β2σ2
ηˆ
+ (1− ρz) (1− ρz−1)σ2
u
[β (a− b) + 1− az] [β (a− b) + 1− az−1]
+
σ2
w
(fβ + 1− ρz)(fβ + 1− ρz−1)
(β(1− a) + 1− az)(β(1− a) + 1− az−1)
}
.
At a CEE a solves
Fˆ
f
(a) ≡ cˆ
2
a2 + cˆ
1
a + cˆ
0
= 0
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with
cˆ
2
= −tˆ(1 + β2) + sˆβ,
cˆ
1
= −2tˆβ(1− ρβ) + sˆ(1− ρβ),
cˆ
0
= −tˆ(1− ρβ)2
where sˆ = β2σ2
ηˆ
+(1+ρ2)σ2
u
+σ2
w
((1+fβ)2+ρ2) and tˆ = σ2
u
ρ+σ2
w
ρ(1+fβ).
When f = 0 we have the previous case. Moreover, Fˆ
f
(1) is increasing in f
and thus there there exists a CEE with b = ρ and a ∈ [0, 1]. It can also be
shown that a < ρ and that a→ ρ when σ2
ηˆ
→ 0, σ2
w
→ 0.
Next, consider the incentives to include judgement. It can be computed
that
y
t+1
− ye
t+1
=
1
1 + β(a− ρ)− aL
×{[
βf(1− aL)− (ρ− a)βfL
1− ρL
+ (1− aL)
]
w
t+1
+
β(1− aL)− (ρ− a)βL
1− ρL
ηˆ
t+1
}
−
kfL
1− ρL
w
t+1
−
kL
1− ρL
ηˆ
t+1
+ term in u
t+1
,
where k = 1 if judgement is included, and zero otherwise. When σ2
ηˆ
→ 0,
σ2
w
→ 0, the relevant terms in the forecast error for assessing judgement are:
1 + βf − (ρ + kf)L
1− ρL
w
t+1
+
β − kL
1− ρL
ηˆ
t+1
.
For the second term the comparison is as before. For the term involving w
t+1
we get for the relevant variances
V ar |
k=0
− V ar |
k=1

f
1 + βf
(
2ρ−
2ρ + f
1 + βf
)
,
where  means “is positively proportional to.” It is seen that the term in
the brackets is positive for all f when βρ > 1/2. This implies that adding a
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small correlation between judgement and unobserved fundamentals does not
alter the incentive condition for inclusion of judgement. In other words, if
βρ > 1/2 an individual agent will make the judgemental adjustment to the
forecast for suﬃciently small values of σ2
ηˆ
and σ2
w
.
To examine the amount of correlation between the fundamental u
t
+ w
t
and the judgement innovation η
t
, we also considered the limit σ2
ηˆ
→ 0 and
computed the correlation for diﬀerent values of σ2
u
, σ2
w
and f under the
constraints that learning convergence and inclusion of judgement is a CEE.
For example, if β = ρ = 0.95, f = 1 and σ2
ηˆ
very small, the correlation can
be pushed beyond 0.9 before the conditions start to fail.
Finally, we show in Appendix D.2 that the learnability requirement is also
met in the extended model. Indeed, the proof of convergence in Appendix
D.2 is worked out for the extended model, with σ2
w
= 0 treated as a special
case.
D Recursive learning
D.1 Recursive least squares
For simplicity, we develop the details in the univariate setting. Econometri-
cians estimate the PLM
y
t
=
p∑
i=1
b
i
y
t−i
+ v
t
using recursive least squares. Let b
t
= (b
1,t
, ..., b
p,t
) denote the parameter esti-
mates at time t and let Y ′
t−1
= (y
t−1
, ..., y
t−p
) be the vector of state variables.
The RLS algorithm is
b′
t
= b′
t−1
+ t−1R−1
t
Y
t−1
(y
t
− b
t−1
Y
t−1
)
R
t
= R
t−1
+ t−1(Y
t−1
Y ′
t−1
−R
t−1
),
where y
t
is given by the univariate version of the ALM (18) with b
i
replaced
by b
i,t−1
. Here R
t
is an estimate of the matrix of second moments of Y
t−1
and
the ﬁrst equation is just the recursive form of the usual least squares formula.
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Note that assumptions about timing are as follows. At the end of period t−1
econometricians update their parameter estimates to b
t−1
using data up to
t−1. At time t econometricians use these parameter estimates and observed
Y
t
to make their forecast E
t
y
t+1
.32 At the end of time t econometricians
update the parameters to b
t
. For further discussion of RLS learning see
Chapters 2 and 8 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
The question of interest is whether lim
t→∞
b
t
→ b¯, where b¯ = (b¯
1
, ..., b¯
p
)
denotes the approximate CEE . In this case b¯ is said to be locally learnable.
It can be shown that the asymptotic dynamics of (b′
t
, R
t
) are governed by
an associated diﬀerential diﬀerential equation and that, in particular, the
asymptotic dynamics of b
t
are governed by
db
dτ
= [Ey
t
(b)Y
t−1
(b)′] [EY
t
(b)Y
t−1
(b)′]
−1
− b = T (b)− b.
Here τ denotes notional or virtual time, y
t
(b) is the stationary stochastic
process given by (18) for ﬁxed b and Y
t−1
(b)′ = (y
t−1
(b), ..., y
t−p
(b)). Numeri-
cally, convergence can be veriﬁed using the E-stability algorithm (20), which
can also be used to compute the approximate CEE.
The above procedure can easily be generalized to the multivariate case in
which the PLM is a VAR(p) process.
D.2 Recursive maximum likelihood
We now consider recursive estimation when the PLM is an ARMA(1,1)
process, that is,
y
t
= by
t−1
+ v
t
+ cv
t−1
,
where y
t
is observed but the white noise process v
t
is not observed. Let b
t
and c
t
denote the estimates of b and c using data through time t − 1. The
econometricians are assumed to use a recursive maximum likelihood (RML)
algorithm, which we now describe.33
32
Note that y
t
and E
∗
t
y
t+1
are simultaneously determined. Alternative information
assumptions could be made but would not aﬀect our main results.
33
For further details on the algorithm see Section 2.2.3 of Ljung and Soderstrom (1983).
The algorithm is often called a recursive prediction error algorithm.
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Let φ′
t
= (b
t
, c
t
). To implement the algorithm an estimate ε
t
of v
t
is
required. Let ε
t
= y
t
− x′
t−1
φ
t−1
, where x′
t−1
= (y
t−1
, ε
t−1
). y
t
is given by
y
t
= β [E
t
y
t+1
+ ξ
t
] + u
t
+ w
t
, where E
t
y
t+1
= b
t−1
y
t
+ c
t−1
ε
t
. Thus the
analysis below holds also for the extended model (12)-(13) (our basic model
sets f = σ2
w
= 0). The RML algorithm is as follows
ψ
t
= −c
t−1
ψ
t−1
+ x
t
φ
t
= φ
t−1
+ t−1R−1
t−1
ψ
t−1
ε
t
R
t
= R
t−1
+ t−1(ψ
t−1
ψ′
t−1
−R
t−1
).
Again the question of interest is whether φ
t
converges to an exact CEE.
Convergence can be studied using the associated ordinary diﬀerential equa-
tion
dφ
dτ
= R−1Eψ
t
(φ)ε
t
(φ) (34)
dR
dτ
= Eψ
t
(φ)ψ
t
(φ)′ −R. (35)
Here y
t
(φ), ψ
t
(φ) and ε
t
(φ) denote the stationary processes for y
t
, ψ
t
and
ε
t
with φ
t
set at a constant value φ. Using the stochastic approximation
tools discussed in Marcet and Sargent (1989), Evans and Honkapohja (1998)
and Chapter 6 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001), it can be shown that the
RML algorithm locally converges provided the associated ordinary diﬀeren-
tial equation is locally asymptotically stable (analogous instability results
are also available). Numerically, convergence of (34)-(35) can be veriﬁed us-
ing a discrete time version of the diﬀerential equation. A ﬁrst-order state
space form is convenient for computing the expectations Eψ
t
(φ)ε
t
(φ) and
Eψ
t
(φ)ψ
t
(φ)′ and this procedure was used for the numerical illustrations
given in the main text.
We now prove convergence analytically for all 0 < β, ρ < 1 with σ2
ηˆ
and
σ2
w
suﬃciently small. This completes the proof of part (i) in Theorem 1. We
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rewrite the system (34)-(35) in the form
dφ
dτ
= (R)−1g(φ)
dR
dτ
= M
ψ
(φ)−R
where we have introduced the simplifying notation g(φ) = Eψ
t
(φ)ε
t
(φ) and
M
ψ
(φ) = Eψ
t
(φ)ψ
t
(φ)′. An equilibrium φ¯, R¯ of the system is deﬁned by
g(φ¯) = 0 and R¯ = M
ψ
(φ¯). As mentioned in Appendix A, there can be two
equilibrium values φ¯
′
= (ρ,−a) determined by the solutions to the quadratic
(28), but we here focus on the solution with 0 < a < 1. Recall that for this
solution a→ ρ as σ2
η
→ 0.
Linearizing the system at the equilibrium point, it can be seen that the
linearized system has a block diagonal structure, in which one block has the
eigenvalues equal to −1 (with multiplicity four) and the eigenvalues of the
other block are equal to those of the “small” diﬀerential equation
dφ
dτ
= (R¯)−1J(φ¯)(φ− φ¯), (36)
where J(φ) is the Jacobian matrix of g(φ). The system (34)-(35) is there-
fore locally asymptotically stable if the coeﬃcient matrix (R¯)−1J(φ¯) of the
two-dimensional linear system (36) has a negative trace and a positive de-
terminant. Since (R¯)−1 = (det(R¯))−1adj(R¯) we have
Tr[(R¯)−1J(φ¯)] = (det(R¯))−1Tr[adj(R¯)J(φ¯)] and
det[(R¯)−1J(φ¯)] = det[(R¯)−1] det[J(φ¯)].
Now det(R¯) > 0 as R¯ is a matrix of second moments and thus positive
deﬁnite for σ2
η
> 0. It thus remains to prove that Tr[adj(R¯)J(φ¯)] < 0 and
det[J(φ¯)] > 0 when σ2
η
> 0 is suﬃciently small.
We consider the values of Tr[adj(R¯)J(φ¯)] and det[J(φ¯)] when σ2
η
→ 0.
Using the deﬁnition of ε
t
, the explicit form of g(φ) is
g(φ) = Eψ
t−1
(φ)x′
t−1
[
(1− βb− βc)−1β
(
−bc
−c2
)
−
(
b
c
)]
+(1− βb− βc)−1βρEψ
t−1
(φ)ξ
t−1
,
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where the moment matrices Eψ
t−1
(φ)x′
t−1
and Eψ
t−1
(φ)ξ
t−1
can be com-
puted from the state space form
AX
t
= CX
t−1
+H

 utηˆ
t
w
t

 , with X
t
=


y
t
ε
t
ξ
t
ψ
t
ψ
t−1

 ,
A =


1 −(1− βb)−1βc −(1− βb)−1β 0 0
−1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
−1 0 0 1 0
0 −1 0 0 1

 ,
C =


0 0 0 0 0
−b −c 0 0 0
0 0 ρ 0 0
0 0 0 −c 0
0 0 0 0 −c

 , H =


(1− βb)−1 0 (1− βb)−1
0 0 0
0 1 f
0 0 0
0 0 0

 .
For the limit σ2
ηˆ
→ 0 and σ2
w
→ 0 we ﬁrst set σ2
w
= λσ2
ηˆ
, where λ > 0
is arbitrary. It can be computed using Mathematica (routine available on
request) that Tr[adj(R¯)J(φ¯)] and det[J(φ¯)] have the following properties as
functions of (using temporary notation) ω ≡ σ2
ηˆ
:
lim
ω→0
Tr[adj(R¯)J(φ¯)] = lim
ω→0
d
dω
Tr[adj(R¯)J(φ¯)] = 0,
lim
ω→0
det[J(φ¯)] = lim
ω→0
d
dω
det[J(φ¯)] = 0,
lim
ω→0
d2
dω2
Tr[adj(R¯)J(φ¯)] = −
4β2ρ2[β + fλ(1 + fβ − ρ2)]2
(1− βρ)(ρ2 − 1)6
< 0 and
lim
ω→0
d2
dω2
det[J(φ¯)] =
2β2ρ2[β + fλ(1 + fβ − ρ2)]2
(ρ2 − 1)6
> 0.
Expressing Tr[adj(R¯)J(φ¯)] and det[J(φ¯)] in terms of Taylor series these re-
sults show that
Tr[adj(R¯)J(φ¯)] < 0 and det[J(φ¯)] > 0
for σ2
η
> 0 suﬃciently small. Q.E.D.
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